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"NEVER INTENDED TO BE APPLIED TO THE WHITE
POPULATION": FIREARMS REGULATION AND
RACIAL DISPARITY-THE REDEEMED
SOUTH'S LEGACY
TO A NATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE?*
ROBERT J. COTrROL** AND RAYMOND

T.

DIAMOND***

I know something of the history of this legislation. The original Act
of 1893 was passed when there was a great influx of negro laborers
in this State drawn here for the purpose of working in turpentine
and lumber camps ....

[T]he Act was passed for the purpose of

disarming the negro laborers and to thereby reduce the unlawful
homicides that were prevalent in turpentine and saw-mill camps and
to give the white citizens in sparsely settled areas a better feeling of
security. The statute was never intended to be applied to the white
population.... [I]t is a safe guess to assume that more than 80% of
the white men living in the rural sections of Florida have violated
this statute.... [T]here has never been, within my knowledge, any
effort to enforce the provisions of this statute as to white people,
because it has been generally conceded to be in contravention of the
Constitution and non-enforceable if contested.'
INTRODUCTION

This Paper is part of our ongoing effort 2 to explore the connections between racial conflict 3 in American history and the evolution of
* This Article had its origins as a paper that was presented in October 1993 at an annual
meeting of the American Society for Legal History. The authors would like to acknowledge the
valuable comments and exchanges that took place at that session. We would also like to
acknowledge helpful comments and suggestions from Paul Finkelman, Nicholas Johnson, and
Don Kates. The authors also note with gratitude the able research assistance of the following
students: Michael O'Hara, Anita Treasurer, Alice Wojenski, Peter Fabriele, and Michele Mason
of the Rutgers School of Law (Camden), Rachel Dickon of George Washington University Law
School, and Eric W. Apple, Hylan T. Hubbard IV, and Robert D. Tennyson of the Tliane
University School of Law.
** Visiting Professor of Law and Legal History, George Washington University Law
School, 1995-96; Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law (Camden). A.B., 1971, Ph.D., (American Studies) 1978, Yale University; J.D., 1984, Georgetown University Law Center.
*** Professor of Law, Tulane University School of Law. A.B. 1973, Yale University; J.D.,
1977, Yale Law School.
1. Watson v. Stone, 4 So. 2d 700, 703 (Fla. 1941) (Buford, J., concurring).
2. For our first effort in this regard, see Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The
Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309 (1991).
3. Like our previous study, this Paper is written from the perspective of two Afro-Americanists, that is those who study the experiences of peoples of African descent in the Americas.
We are focusing on the history of black-white conflict and the role that conflict has played both
in shaping the constitutional concept of the right to bear arms and in influencing legislation
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the notion of the right to bear arms in American constitutionalism. 4
governing the ownership and carrying of firearms. There are other issues concerning race or
ethnicity and its influence on the right to bear arms that are or should also be of concern to
students of American legal history. Clearly the conflict between white settlers and the native
Indian population profoundly influenced the development of both the practice of owning and
carrying arms in American culture and the state and federal constitutional provisions guaranteeing the right to bear arms. See, e.g., DAVID B. KOPEL, THE SAMURAI, THE MOUNTIE AND THE
COWBOY: SHOULD AMERICA ADOPT THE GUN CONTROLS OF OTHER DEMOCRACIES? 307-11
(1992); Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 2, at 323-24.
Ethnic conflict and the fear of southern and eastern European immigrants influenced the
development of firearms laws in parts of the nation. See, e.g., Don B. Kates, Jr., Toward a History of Handgun Prohibition in the United States [hereinafter Handgun Prohibition], in RESTRICTING HANDGUNS:

THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT 15-24 (Don B. Kates, Jr. ed., 1979);

supra, at 342-44.
4. Here we will be concerned not only with the issue of the Second Amendment, but also
with what it was originally intended to mean and how courts and commentators have subsequently treated this constitutional provision. We will also be concerned with state constitutional
doctrine covering the right to keep and bear arms. There is often lively dispute concerning the
KOPEL,

extent to which the Second Amendment was meant to protect the right of individuals to keep
and bear arms as opposed to the right of states to maintain militias. See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERYMAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RiGrr (1984);
JOYCE L. MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMs: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN

RIGHT (1994); Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights and the FourteenthAmendment, 101 YALE L.J.
1193, 1210-12 (1992); Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131
(1991); Lawrence D. Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and Meaning of the Right to
Bear Arms, 71 J.AM. HIST. 22 (1984); Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second
Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 5 (1989); David T. Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiographyof the Bill of
Rights, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 1 (1987); Dennis A. Henigan, Arms, Anarchy and the Second Amendment,
26 VAL U. L.REV. 107 (1991); Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: ConstitutionalFalse Consciousness
and Dereliction of Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV. 57 (1995); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204
(1983); Sanford Levinson, The EmbarrassingSecond Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989); Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, PoliticalLiberty, and the Right to Self-Preservation,39 ALA.
L. REV. 103 (1987); Glenn H. Reynolds, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms Under the Tennessee
Constitution-"A Case Study in Civic Republican Thought, 61 TENN. L. REV. 647 (1994); Robert
E. Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment 69 J. AM. HIST. 599 (1982);
William Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the PersonalRight to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J.
1236 (1994); David E. Vandercoy, The History of the Second Amendment 28 VAL_ U. L. REV.
1007 (1994); David Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551 (1991). It cannot be disputed, however, that the notion of the
right to bear arms has long been a part of American constitutional thought. It is, of course, a
part of the jurisprudence and commentary treating the Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Legal doctrine concerning the right to keep and bear arms has perhaps been even
better developed in state constitutional jurisprudence. Some forty-three state constitutions have
provisions safeguarding the right to bear arms, and there has been extensive state court jurisprudence on the subject, far more so than the rather restricted federal jurisprudence. See STEPHEN
P. HALBROOK, A RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: STATE AND FEDERAL BILLS OF RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES (1989) [hereinafter RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS]; Robert J. Cottrol, The
Second Amendment. Invitation to a Multi-Dimensional Debate in 1 GUN CONTROL AND THE
CONSTITUTION: SOURCES AND EXPLORATIONS ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT xxxiii-xxxiv (Rob-

ert J. Cottrol ed., 1993) [hereinafter Invitation].
We do not intend in this Paper to say much concerning the debate over whether or not the
Second Amendment was meant to safeguard an individual right to keep and bear arms or
whether it was simply meant to preserve the right of states to maintain militias. We have participated in that debate in previous efforts and will doubtlessly do so in the future. See Robert J.
Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, Public Safety and the Right to Bear Arms in THE BILL OF
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Although there has been a growing awareness on the part of historians and legal scholars of the connection between the attempt of
Southern states to restrict the right to bear arms on the part of newly
emancipated blacks immediately after the Civil War and the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and contemporaneous civil rights
legislation,5 the study of the connection between racial conflict and
the jurisprudence of the right to bear arms has hardly begun.
This Paper hopes to begin that inquiry. It asks questions about
the South during the eras of Reconstruction and Redemption. To
what extent did the white South, which had historically attempted to
prevent blacks from having access to firearms, 6 try to restrict black
7
access to arms after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment?
RIGrrs IN MODERN AMERICA: AFTER 200 YEARS 72 (James W. Ely, Jr. & David J.
Bodenhamer eds., 1993); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Fifth Auxiliary Right,
104 YALE L.J. 995 (1995) (book review); Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 2, at 309; Cottrol,
Invitation, supra.
Suffice it to say that in our view the best reading of the history of the Second Amendment
indicates that the framers of that constitutional provision did intend to protect an individual
right to arms and that their view of the militia was of a body that would include virtually the
entire adult white male population, which was expected to muster bearing their private arms.
With few exceptions, historian Lawrence Cress being most prominent among these, advocates of
the collective right or militia only theory of the Second Amendment have simply not made much
in the way of a convincing historical argument that the Second Amendment was not meant to
protect the private possession of arms.
Advocates of the collective rights view, of course, have been more convincing when discussing federal courts jurisprudence, particularly since the Second World War, but that of course
is far from a discussion of the intent of the framers.
For a collection presenting articles and essays on both sides of the Second Amendment

controversy see

GUN CONTROL AND THE CONsTiTUrION: SOURCES AND EXPLORATIONS ON THE
SECOND AMENDMENT, supra; RESTRICTING HANDGUNS: THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT,

supra.

5. See, HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW:
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835-1875, at 405 (1982); Stephen P. Halbrook, The Jurisprudence of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, 4 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 1 (1981). Some
very interesting work along these lines has been done by Akhil Amar who argues that the response of the Thirty-Ninth Congress to disarm blacks caused the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment to attempt not merely to incorporate or apply the Second Amendment to the
states, but to transform the Second Amendment from a provision that was meant to safeguard
the right of individuals to have weapons in order to participate in the militia to a right of individuals to have weapons for self-defense, including defense against state and private deprivations of
rights. See Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, supra note 4, at 1260-62.
6. See, e.g., Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 2, at 325-26, 336-38, 344-46.
7. The intent of many of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment was to make the
Second Amendment's right to keep and bear arms apply to the states through the privileges or
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See HYMAN & WIECEK, supra note 5, at 405;
see also MICHAEL K. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
THE BILL OF RIGm'S (1986). That intention was thwarted fairly early on by judicial construction.
See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 266 (1886). Despite this, the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause presented a formidable barrier to the disarming of blacks. The antebellum laws that prohibited the possession of arms by slaves and free Negroes and similar restrictions in the immediate post-war black codes probably could not have survived even the lax equal
protection scrutiny that had developed by the early part of the twentieth century. See Randall L.
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Were various statutes in Southern states restricting either the carrying
of concealed pistols or prohibiting the sale of certain types of firearms8 enacted with racial motives in mind? And if the motives behind
these statutes were racial, which of several possible racial motives
played the predominate role in influencing this type of legislation?
Were legislators primarily concerned with maintaining traditional patterns of racial control? Did they see provisions that would disarm
blacks as measures that would deprive blacks of the means of resisting
the extra-legal violence that played such a crucial role in Southern
Redemption, the re-establishment of white rule in the South at the
turn of the century? 9 Or were measures that would work to disarm
blacks enacted in response to the growing stereotype of the Negro as
brute, which began to expand in the white South's consciousness in
the years when Jim Crow was being implemented? 10 To what extent
were Southern firearm restrictions, like restrictions that were developing in other parts of the nation," a response to the view that new
dangerous classes were beginning to emerge-classes that posed a
danger not only to the better elements of society, but indeed classes
whose members needed to be protected from the more vicious in their
ranks?
If the motive behind restrictive firearms legislation raises interesting questions, the questions of enforcement and the judicial response to such legislation raise even more questions. If, as Judge
Buford's concurrence indicated, these measures were enforced and
only deemed acceptable with a significant amount of racial discriminaKennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1753-54 (1989). After
the Fourteenth Amendment, the difficulty faced by the white South was how to express its historical desire to disarm the black population, when the Fourteenth Amendment placed severe
restrictions on openly discriminatory disarmament and neither Southern culture, politics nor indeed state constitutional law would permit a general disarmament of the population.
8. For example, see David Kopel's discussion of the origins of Saturday Night Special legislation. KOPEL, supra note 3, at 336.
9. Among the works that have investigated the role of white terror in "redeeming" the
South, see ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877,
at 564-600 (1988); GEORoE C. RABLE, BUT THmRE WAS No PEACE: THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE IN
THE POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCION (1984); ALLEN W. TRELEASE, W=TE TERROR:
KLUX KLAN CONSPIGRACY AND SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION (1971).

THE Ku

10. See, e.g., I. A. NEwBY, Jtm CROW'S DEFENSE: ATI-NEiGRO THouGTrr IN AMERICA,
1900-1930, at 42-44, 123-24 (1965); JOEL WILLIAMSON, A RAGE FOR ORDER: BLAcK/W'IrrE
RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH SINCE EMANCIPATION (1986); Robert J. Cottrol, The Historical Definition of Race Law, 21 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 865, 867 (1988).
11.

For a discussion of the role of anti-immigrant and particularly anti-Italian sentiment in

the passage and initial enforcement of New York's Sullivan Law, which requires a permit in
order to carry a pistol, see KOPEL, supra note 3, at 342-44; Handgun Prohibition,supra note 3, at
15-24.
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tion,12 the story of the judicial treatment of these measures provides
another chapter in the history of the evisceration of the notion of
equal protection in American constitutionalism during the Jim Crow
era.13 It also provides an important chapter in the development of the
jurisprudence of the right to keep and bear arms.
This Paper explores some of the questions raised by restrictive
firearms legislation and the response of state judiciaries to that legislation. It is especially concerned with whether the experience of trying
to fashion judicial doctrine that would sustain such legislation helped
to alter constitutional notions concerning the right to bear arms. Our
research in this area is still in the preliminary stages. For the most
part, our conclusions are not definitive. Instead we intend to outline
what our findings suggest at this point in our research as an indication
of future directions that our research and, we hope, the research of
others might take in this area.
That having been said, this Paper is divided into four parts. The
first discusses the importance and prevalence of arms in Southern history and how that importance early on was recognized in state court
jurisprudence in the region. The second part examines the enactment
of state statutes regulating the carrying and purchase of firearms during and after Reconstruction and examines possible discriminatory
motivations behind their passage. The third section examines judicial
efforts to reconcile the new postbellum restrictions on the right to
bear arms with the South's robust cultural and legal tradition supporting that right. The Paper's concluding section discusses the difficulty
of separating diverse racial and other motives behind the enactment
of the statutes under consideration, the judicial response to such statutes, and the adoption of Southern precedents in this area in other
jurisdictions.
12. Judge Buford's views were anticipated in an earlier Ohio case. In his dissent from an

opinion upholding the conviction of Mike Nieto, a Mexican laborer, for carrying a loaded pistol
on the property of the United Alloy Steel Company, Judge Wanamaker of the Ohio Supreme
Court noted:

I desire to give some special attention to some of the authorities cited, supreme
court decisions from Alabama, Georgia, Arkansas, Kentucky, and one or two inferior
court decisions from New York.... The southern states have very largely furnished the

precedents. It is only necessary to observe that the race issue there has extremely intensified a decisive purpose to entirely disarm the negro, and this policy is evident upon
reading the opinions. What may have seemed sufficient reason for a holding concerning the carrying of concealed weapons in one's own home in those states, does not
oblige the supreme court of Ohio to make a similar holding in this state.

State v. Nieto, 130 N.E. 663, 669 (Ohio 1920).
13. For a discussion of how willing the academy was to ignore the principle earlier in the
century, see Kennedy, supra note 7, at 1753-54.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

I.

[Vol. 70:1307

ARMS, RIGHTS, AND RACE IN EARLY SOUTHERN LAW AND
CULTURE

A.

A Neglected Jurisprudence

The right to keep and bear arms presents something of a paradox
in American law. The ownership, and to a lesser extent the carrying,
of firearms are indisputably a part of American culture. In this, the
last decade of the twentieth century, the United States is one of a
handful of modern, industrialized, western nations where firearms
ownership is common-roughly fifty percent of American homes are
reported to contain at least one firearm. 14 There are also an estimated
20,000 federal, state, and local statutes and ordinances regulating the
ownership, possession, carrying, and use of firearms.' 5 Finally, there
is the Second Amendment to the Constitution and some forty-three
16
analogous state provisions.
Despite the prevalence of firearms and legislation directed at regulating firearms, the jurisprudence of the Second Amendment remains amazingly thin. The Supreme Court has pronounced directly
on the subject in only three cases, the last occasion over fifty years
ago. 17 Second Amendment claims have received rather cursory dismissal in lower federal courts in recent decades,18 reflecting a combination of judicial hostility' 9 and the predominance of Second
Amendment claims made by those involved in criminal activity.20 The
Second Amendment has, in recent decades, attracted so little in the
way of serious judicial or academic commentary that it has caused one
14.

JAMES

D.

WRIGrr ET AL., UNDER THE

Gut:

WEAPONS, CRIME AND VIOLENCE IN

AMERICA 106 (1983). The commonly accepted figure is that there are some 200 million firearms
in private hands in the United states. Id. The U.S. figure of 50% of households might be contrasted with other nations where a high percentage of households have firearms prefient. Id. In
Switzerland the entire adult male population is issued firearms by the government as part of that
nation's universal militia system. KOPEL, supra note 3, at 278-302. Similarly, in Israel, government issued firearms are common in Jewish households as part of that nation's military reserve
system. Id. at 301 n.90.
15. WRIGHT, supra note 14, at 323.
16. See RIGHT To BEAR ARMS, supra note 4.
17. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886);
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
18. See, e.g., Love v. Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 123-24 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Hale,
978 F.2d 1016, 1020 (8th Cir. 1992); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Three Winchester 30-30 Caliber Lever Action Carbines, 504 F.2d 1288, 1289-90,
1293 (7th Cir. 1974).
19. Invitation,supra note 4, at xxxix-xli; Michael J. Quinlan, Is There a Neutral Justification
for Refusing to Implement the Second Amendment or Is the Supreme Court Just "Gun Shy"?, 22
CAP. U. L. REv. 641 (1993).
20. See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 2, at 310 n.3.
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federal appellate judge to call it "the orphan of the bill of rights. '21
Indeed, one leading constitutional scholar has called his discussion
of the constitutional provision, "the Embarrassing Second
Amendment." 22
If there is little in the way of serious federal jurisprudence concerning the right to arms, the situation with respect to state court jurisprudence has been quite the reverse. From the early years of the
nineteenth century until the present, state courts have had to wrestle
with the complexities of reconciling a right with obvious dangers and
perceived needs for regulation in the interest of public safety. State
supreme courts have dealt with such issues as what kind of weapons
were protected, 23 whether or not the right extended to the carrying of
concealed weapons, 24 and whether or not the right to arms could be
26
denied to aliens 25 or to those with previous criminal convictions.
The states have developed a widely contrasting jurisprudence. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has held that the state's
right to keep and bear arms provision 27 was meant to apply only to the
state's militia, in effect nullifying any potential that provision was
meant to have to safeguard an individual right to arms. In 1980 the
Oregon Supreme Court interpreted that state's provision 28 as safeguarding virtually every type of weapon not outlawed by federal statute. 29 The jurisprudence of most state courts has tended to fall

between these two poles. 30

B. Antebellum Constitutional and Statutory Enactments
As they entered the period of Reconstruction, it was clear that,
like their Northern sisters, the Southern states had long recognized
the right, even the duty, to keep and carry arms. This right and duty
were occasioned in part by the utility of arms in providing for the
common defense against threats both from without and within. In the
21. United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1364 n.46 (5th Cir. 1993).
22. Levinson, supra note 4.
23. Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154, 156 (1840).
24. Id. at 157; State v. Nieto, 130 N.E. 663,664 (Ohio 1920); Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. 165,
171 (1871).
25. People v. Nakamura, 62 P.2d 246 (Colo. 1936).
26. See, e.g., People v. Marques, 498 P.2d 929 (Colo. 1972); Nelson v. State, 195 So. 2d 853,
855-56 (Fla. 1967).
27. Commonwealth v. Davis, 343 P.2d 847, 848-49 (Or. 1976).
28. "The people shall have the right to bear arms for the defence of themselves, and the

State, but the Military shall be kept in strict subordination to the civil power ...... OR. CONST.
art. I, § 27.
29. State v. Kessler, 614 P.2d 94 (Or. 1980).
30. See generally RIGHT TO BEAR ARMs,

supra note 4.
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antebellum period, the threat from without was shared by Northern
and Southern states, for both were threatened by the existence and
possible responses of the Native American population and by foreign
31
powers with designs on and, indeed, footholds in North America.
The threat from within, however, was not shared, for the South's large
population of slaves constituted a potential danger to the free white
population, a danger that had to be controlled. 32 Thus, the Southern
states had long experimented with measures designed to disarm their
black population, both slave and free. 33 For these states, firearms regulation was not tabula rasa and gun control would be an active
consideration.
If the Southern states actively undertook firearms regulation
before the Civil War, such legislation was not authorized explicitly by
state constitutions. By negative inference, legislatures in Virginia,
Delaware, Maryland, Georgia, and Louisiana had constitutional
power in this area, for the antebellum constitutions of none of these
states explicitly recognized a right to keep and bear arms.34 Yet even
the earliest constitutions of each of these states recognized the existence and importance of the militia in the scheme of constitutional liberty. Such recognition by implication spoke to and perhaps
recognized a right to arms. A "well-regulated militia," stated the Virginia Bill of Rights, would be "composed of the body of the people,
trained to arms. '35 The Delaware constitution made no such declaration, but recognized the militia's existence in authorizing its officers to
hold seats in the legislature if elected 36 and recognized the militia's
importance by forbidding standing armies "without the consent of the
legislature. '37 Like the Virginia constitution, the Maryland constitution declared that the militia "is the proper and natural defence of a
31. Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 2, at 323-27.
32. HERBERT APTHEKER, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVE REVOLTS 8-52, 162-208 (1983); Robert
J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, Book Review, 56 TuL- L. REV. 1107, 1110-12 (1982).

33. Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 2, at 325, 335-38.
34. See THm FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTrrUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES (Benjamin P. Poore ed., 2d ed., Washington, Government
Printing Office 1878) [hereinafter CONsTrrUTIONS].
35. VA. BILL OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 13, reprintedin 2 CONSTrnTIONS, supra note 34, at 1908.
The Bill of Rights was adopted by all subsequent constitutions of the state. 2 CONSTITUTIONS,
supra note 34, at 1908-76.
36. DEL- CONST. of 1792, art. II, § 12, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 28081; DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. 1I, § 12, reprinted in I CONSTITTONS,supra note 34, at 291-92; see
also DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 28, reprinted in 1 CoNsTrruTIoNs, supra note 34, at 277 (forbidding musters of the militia on election days).
37. DEL- CONST. of 1792, art. I, § 17, reprinted in 1 CONSTrrUONS, supra note 34, at 279;
DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. I, § 17, reprinted in 1 CONsTrTUONS, supra note 34, at 290.
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38s The Virginia Bill of Rights declared the militia a
free government.
"safe ' 39 defense as well, to be contrasted with that to be provided by a
standing army. Such armies, at least in time of peace, were denominated both in Virginia and Maryland as "dangerous to liberty." 4°
Louisiana is the sole exception among this group in that it maintained
and gave constitutional recognition to, but did not constitutionally and
explicitly recognize, the importance of a militia. 41 Thus, at least in
these states that spoke to the importance of a militia, a right to bear
arms might be inferred from this importance, and the regulation of
firearms might be limited by the importance of the militia in the very
maintenance of the state.
Yet if these states recognized a right to bear arms only by implication, other states would do so explicitly. The North Carolina Constitution of 1776 declared that "the people have a right to bear arms, for
the defence of the State. '42 Kentucky's constitutions of 1792 and 1799
38. MD.CONST. of 1776, declaration of rights, art. XXV, reprinted in 1 CONSTrruTiONS,
supra note 34, at 819; MD.CONST. of 1851, declaration of rights, art. 25, reprintedin 1 CONSTrruTIONS, supra note 34, at 839; MD.CONST. of 1864, declaration of rights, art. 28, reprinted in 1
CONSTrUTIoNS, supra note 34, at 861; MD. CONST. of 1867, declaration of rights, art. 28, reprinted in 1 CONSTrrUTIONS, supra note 34, at 861; see also VA. BILL OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 13,
reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1908.
39. VA. BILL OF Riomrs of 1776, § 13, reprintedin 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1908;
MD. CONST. of 1776, declaration of rights, art. XXVI, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
34, at 819; MD.CONST. of 1851, declaration of rights, art. 25, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 34, at 839; MD.CONST. of 1864, declaration of rights, art. 28, reprinted in 1 CoNsTrrTIONS,
supra note 34, at 861; MD.CONST. of 1867, declaration of rights, art. 28, reprintedin 1 CONSTrruTIONS, supra note 34, at 890.
40. VA. BILL OF RIGHTS of 1776, § 13, reprintedin 2 CoNsTrIONS, supra note 34, at 1908;
MD. CONST. of 1776, declaration of rights, art. XXVII, reprintedin 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note
34, at 819; MD.CONST. of 1851, declaration of rights, art. 26, reprinted in 1 CoNSTrrrUONS, supra
note 34, at 839; MD.CONST. of 1864, declaration of rights, art. 29, reprintedin 1 CONsTrrrUriONS,
supra note 34, at 861; MD.CONST. of 1867, declaration of rights, art. 29, reprintedin 1 CoNSrrruTIONS, supra note 34, at 890.
41. The Louisiana Constitution of 1812 makes no mention of a right to bear arms, but explicitly recognizes the militia in that the governor is constituted as its commander-in-chief. LA.
CONST. of 1812, art. III, § 8, reprinted in 1 CoNSTrrrUnONS, supra note 34, at 703. Louisiana
militia units manned by gens de couleur librewere in large measure responsible for victory at the
Battle of New Orleans at the close of the War of 1812. GARY DONALDSON, TE HISTORY OF
AFRIcAN-AMERICANS IN THE MILITARY 29-30 (1991); JACK D. FONER, BLACKS AND THE MILITARY N AMERICAN HISTORY: A NEW PERSPECTrIVE 24-25 (1974); MORRIS J. MACGREGOR &
BERNARD C. NALTY, 1 BLACKS IN TmE UNrrED STATES ARMED FORCES 207-17 (1977); BERNARD C. NALTY, STRENGTH FOR THE FIGHT: A HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICANS IN THE MILITARY 24-25 (1986); Lorenzo J.Greene, The Negro in the War of 1812 and the Civil War, 14
NEGRO HIST. BULL. 133-38 (1951). Black troops of the First Louisiana Native Guards, subsequently designated the Seventy-Third Regiment of the United States Colored Troops, were accepted into federal service during the Civil War on September 27, 1862, and were not only the
first organized black troops in the union army, but on May 27, 1863, were also the first in combat
in the Civil War. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THE NEGRO'S CIVL WAR: How AMERICAN NEGROES FELT AND ACrED 183-85 (1865); NALTY, supra, at 36-37.
42. N.C. CONST. of 1776, declaration of rights, art. XVII, reprinted in 2 CONSrrruTIONS,
supra note 34, at 1410.
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stated a right of "citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and
45
the State... . ,,43 Mississippi in 1817 and 1832,"4 Kentucky in 1850,
and Texas in 183646 declared the right to bear arms in similar language, and Missouri in 1820 declared this right to belong to "the
people.

'47

An important distinction among these statutes is that only some
of them explicitly spoke to a right to individual self-defense. This difference would take on significance as state courts encountered questions of the legitimacy of states controlling the use and carriage of
firearms. A second distinction, between rights belonging to "the people" and those belonging to "citizens," arguably makes no difference, 48 but calls into question whether other distinctions might be
made between the people or the citizens, on the one hand, and others.
Certainly, such distinctions were made. Setting aside the accuracy of Chief Justice Taney's dictum in the Dred Scott case, that persons of African descent were not, at the time of the Revolution and
the framing of the Constitution, part of "the people" and thus not
citizens of the United States as a nation, 49 it was increasingly apparent
throughout the antebellum period that Southern states did not consider even free blacks to be citizens of the states themselves.

43. Ky. CONST. of 1792, art. XII, § 23, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 655;
Ky. CONST. of 1799, art. X, § 23, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 657. These
provisions supplemented Article VI, Section 2 of the Kentucky Constitution of 1792, which mandated that "[tlhe freemen of this commonwealth shall be armed and disciplined for its defence"
and Article III, Section 28 of the Kentucky Constitution of 1799, which rendered the same requirement by specifically excepting "negroes, mulattoes, and Indians." 1 CoNsrrrTrIONS, supra
note 34, at 652, 662.
44. MISS. CONST. of 1817, art. I, § 23, reprinted in 2 CoNsTrrurnONS, supra note 34, at 1056;
Miss. CONST. of 1832, art. I, § 23, reprintedin 2 CoNsrrrtrONS, supra note 34, at 1068.
45. Ky. CONST. of 1850, art. XIII, § 25, reprinted in 1 CONsTrrrin-oNs, supra note 34, at 685.
46. TEx. CONST. of 1836, declaration of rights, art. 14, reprintedin 2 CONSTrlrONS, supra
note 34, at 1763.
47. Mo. CONST. of 1820, art. XIII, § 3, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1114.
48. See United States v. Verdugo, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1989).
49. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405, 418-19 (1857). Chief Justice Taney
reached this conclusion primarily by looking to the mass of discriminatory state legislation and
state constitutional law, limiting the rights of free blacks. Id. at 412-16; see also LEON F.
LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: Tim NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860 (1967); Cottrol &
Diamond, supra note 2, at 339-40; cf. V. JACQUE VOEGL, FREE BUT NOT EOUAL: THE MIDWEST AND THE NEGRO DURING THE CIVn. WAR (1967). Chief Justice Taney ignored or otherwise dismissed a body of politically and physically liberating legislative and constitutional law
that states had adopted in the wake of the Revolution, law that cast doubt as to the legitimacy of
Chief Justice Taney's conclusion. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 572-76 (Curtis, J., dissenting); see also Raymond T. Diamond & Robert J. Cottrol, Codifying Caste: Louisiana's Racial
Classification Scheme and the Fourteenth Amendment, 29 Loy. L. REv. 255, 260-62 (1983).
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This was certainly the case in North Carolina, as State v. NewsoM, 50 an 1844 case involving the right to bear arms, indicates. In
Newsom, the North Carolina Supreme Court decided the constitutionality of a statute requiring a license for free blacks to keep or carry
arms. 5 ' The North Carolina Constitution of 1776 provided in part
"[t]hat the people have a right to bear arms, for the defense of the
State .... 52 Only a year previous, the court had determined that this
right included an individual right. 53 In Newsom, however, the court
determined that although this individual right to arms extended to
"the people" and thus to all citizens, free blacks were not citizens and
were thus excluded from exercising the right.
Other states, too, denied blacks the right to arms that was guaranteed all citizens. Newly constituted as a state and fresh with the egalitarian ideals of the Revolution, Tennessee in its original constitution
declared in 1796 a right of all "freemen" to bear arms for the common
defense.54 Tennessee would be explicit in 1834 by limiting the right to
"free white men."155 This was the tack taken by Arkansas in 1836 and
Florida in 1838, which in identical language declared "[tihat the free
white men of this State shall have a right to keep and to bear arms for
56
their common defence."
One way or another, then, either because states had been explicit
about limiting the right to bear arms to free white men or because
blacks were defined outside the class of citizen, the antebellum legislatures of the Southern states were free to control the access of their
black population to firearms, and they exercised this freedom. At one
end of the spectrum of controls was Mississippi, which forbade arms
to both slaves and free blacks after 1852.57 At the other end was Kentucky, which did not legislate the possession and carrying of arms by
blacks, but instead provided that a slave or free black who "willfully
50. 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 203 (1844).
51. Act of Jan, 11, 1841, ch. 30, 1840-1841 N.C. Sess. Laws 61.
52. N.C. CONST. of 1776, declaration of rights, art. XVII, reprinted in 2 CONSTrruTIONS,
supra note 34, at 1410.
53. State v. Huntly, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 311, 314 (1843).
54. TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. XI, § 26, reprinted in 2 CONsTrruTnONS, supra note 34, at
1675.
55. TENN. CONST. of 1834, art. I, § 26, reprintedin 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1679.
Tennessee's Constitution of 1834 also denied blacks the right to vote. TENN. CONST. of 1834, art.
IV, § 1, reprinted in 2 CONSrUTnONS, supra note 34, at 1683.
56. ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. II, § 21, reprintedin 1 CONSTrrUTIONS, supra note 34, at 103;
FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. I, § 21, reprinted in 1 CONSTTuTIONS, supra note 34, at 318.
57. Act of Mar. 15, 1852, ch. 206, 1852 Miss. Laws 328 (repealed Act of June 18, 1822, ch.

73, §§10, 12, 1822 Miss. Laws 179, 181-83, which allowed slaves and free blacks to obtain licenses
to carry firearms).
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and maliciously" shot at a white person would suffer the death penalty.5 8 Between these two choices were a variety of alternatives.
Slaves were generally governed under less restrictive measures, perhaps on the theory that they were already under the supervision of
their masters.5 9 Free blacks fared harshly under antebellum firearms
controls, 6° as they did generally under Southern regimes, 61 in which
they served as a threat to the system of racial oppression, both because they served as a bad example to slaves and because they might
instigate or participate in a rebellion by their slave brethren. 62 Free
blacks were subject to a variety of measures meant to limit black acsuch access through
cess to firearms through licensure or to eliminate
63
outright prohibitions on firearms ownership.
C. Judicial Interpretationin a Region at Arms
It was in the South as a region that state courts first began the
effort to reconcile the right to arms with restrictions designed to promote public safety. This effort began the still largely unrealized project of transforming the notion of a right to arms from an object of
Whiggish political theory6 to a matter of workable jurisprudence. In
many ways it was natural that the South would play this pioneering
role. If guns and a right to arms have been a peculiar part of American culture, 65 they have been perhaps even more distinctively a part of
the lawways and folkways of the South. 66 Almost from the beginning,
the unique need to maintain white domination in the nation's first
58. Act of Feb. 10, 1819, ch. CCCCXLVIII, § 1, 1819 Ky. Acts 787. The law was first limited
to slave offenders. Id. In 1851 the legislature extended these provisions to free blacks as well.
Act of Mar. 24, 1851, ch. 617, art. VII, § 7, 1850 Ky. Acts 300.
59. See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 2, at 336-38.

60. Id.
61. Id. at 335-36 & nn.125-29.
62. Id at 335. This fear was particularly felt when relatively successful slave uprisings did
occur. For the discussion, see Id. at 338 & nn.138-46.

63. Id. at 337-38 & nn.126-46. Such provisions were often susceptible of enforcement
through patrols also mandated by statute. Id. at 336-38 & nn.134, 144-46.

64. For the definitive discussion of the role that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English Whigs played in transforming the traditional English duty to be armed for the common

defense into the Anglo-American constitutional notion of a right to be armed as a hedge against
potential governmental tyranny, see MALCOLM, supra note 4.
65. The discussion on guns as a cultural phenomenon in American society has produced a
voluminous literature too extensive to be discussed here. TWo works can provide a useful beginning to this literature: LEE KENNETr & JAMES L ANDERSON, THE GUN IN AMERICA: THE
ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL DILEMMA (1975); B. Bruce-Briggs, The Great American Gun War, 45

PUB. INTEREST 37 (1976).
66. See, e.g., Jo Dixon & Alan J. Lizotte, Gun Ownership and the Southern Subculture of
Violence, 93 AM. J. Soc. 383 (1987); see also sources cited infra note 71.
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truly multi-racial society 67 led the South to a greater vigor with respect
to the private possession of arms and to the universal depulization of
the white population as a means of insuring racial control. 68 This pattern would begin long before the American evolution and the subse69
quent adoption of the Second Amendment.
And it would continue and be strengthened well into the nineteenth century. After the War of 1812, at a time when national commentators came to decry the decreased willingness of the population
as a whole to participate in militia training and to fear that neglect
might erode either the right to arms or the effectiveness of private
arms in resisting potential tyranny,70 the practice of widespread active
militia 7 ' participation would remain a vigorous part of Southern
culture.
67. Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 2, at 323-27.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story discussed the importance of the right to bear arms
and the danger that popular neglect of the militia might ultimately impair the right or at least the
practice of having an armed population capable of resisting tyranny:
The right of the citizens to keep, and bear arms has justly been considered, as the
palladium of the liberties of a republic, since it offers a strong moral check against the
usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers; and will generally, even if these are successful
in the first instance, enable the people to resist, and triumph over them. And yet,
though this truth would seem so... undeniable, it cannot be disguised, that among the
American people there is a growing indifference to any system of militia discipline, and
a strong disposition, from a sense of its burthens, to be rid of all regulations. How is it
practicable to keep the people duly armed without some organization, it is difficult to
see. There is certainly no small danger, that indifference may lead to disgust, and disgust to contempt; and thus gradually undermine all the protection intended by this
clause of our national bill of rights.
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 708-09 (Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833).
71. By militia, we mean not only the formal state militia, i.e., the state's military organization, but also other bodies of deputized citizens called upon to maintain the security of a community. This citizen support of law enforcement, the posse comitatis, would fall under this
definition of militia. In the antebellum South, slave patrols designed to police the slave population were a specialized form of militia. Historian Eugene Genovese has captured some of the
difficulties Southern communities encountered in recruiting members of slave patrols:
To curb runaways, hold down interplantation theft, and prevent the formation of
insurrectionary plots, the slaveholders developed an elaborate system of patrols. Some
states required them, whereas others merely authorized local communities to organize
them. Usually a captain and three others, appointed for a period of a few months,
worked the roads and checked the plantation quarters every few weeks or as often as
the current temper dictated. Slaves caught without passes could expect summary punishment of about twenty lashes.
In normal times the patrols slacked off as conscripted citizens found the task irksome. In South Carolina and Alabama they functioned better than elsewhere, but in
most states they periodically lapsed into passivity. A Georgia planter complained:
"Our patrol laws are seldom enforced, and even where there is a mock observance of
them, it is by a parcel of boys or idle men, the height of whose ambition is to 'ketch a
nigger."'
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Southern culture would also come to sanction the use of arms in
contexts that went far beyond either personal or communal defense.
For white men, the use of arms to resolve personal disputes and the
frequent preference for dueling instead of use of the courts to redress
insults and other slights, real or perceived, helped lend a different flavor to the Southern experience with arms-a flavor that was remarkable even in a nation distinguished by widespread firearms ownership

72
and use.
It was in this Southern atmosphere that in so many ways encouraged the use of arms, that legislative bodies first came to consider,
on a widespread level, limits on the right to arms. The first set of
limits were widespread throughout the South and generally agreed
upon, that blacks whether slave or free would have severely limited
access to firearms. 73 This form of firearms control provoked little controversy in the white South, even amongst slave-owners who felt seComplaints against the patrols came from both masters and slaves. The masters, in
ordinary times, bought their way out of patrol duty and then fumed because the poor
whites who replaced them abused the slaves and unsettled the quarters. The brutality
of the patrols drew widespread protest from the slaves who suffered from arbitrary or
excessive beating. As a result, the slaves often regarded their masters as protectors
against the patrols, and sometimes the masters in fact were. However irregular and lax,
the patrols accomplished their main purpose: they struck terror in the slaves.
EUGENE GENOVESE, RoLL JORDAN ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 617-18 (1974).
For a discussion of the widespread depulization of the South Carolina white population and
the use of vigilante tactics as a means of social control of the black population, see MICHAEL
HINDUS, PRISON AND PLANTATION: CRIME, JUSTICE
SOUTH CAROLINA, 1767-1878, at 36-42 (1980).

AND AUTHOR=

IN MASSACHUSETTS AND

72. A number of commentators have discussed the broad support for quasi-legal and extralegal violence in traditional Southern culture. See JOHN H. FRANKLIN, THE MILrrAr'rr SOUTH,

1800-1861 (1956); Warren F. Schwartz et al., The Duel: Can These Gentlemen Be Acting Efficiently? 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 321 (1984); William M. Wiecek, "Old imes There Are Not Forgotten".: The Distinctiveness of the Southern Constitutional Experience, in AN UNCERTAIN
TRADITION: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 159, 186-88 (Kermit L. Hall
& James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1989); HNDus, supra note 71, at 42-48; WILLIAMSON, supra note 10, at

84-85, 120-26.
Extra-legal violence has of course existed in other regions. The American West in the nineteenth century had considerable vigilante activity and, of course, widespread dueling-the gunfights of western legend. The tradition of extra-legal violence in the West and South can,
nonetheless be distinguished. Western vigilantism appears to have been a temporary response to
the absence of official law enforcement in the early stages of frontier settlement. Recent research also suggests that dueling, or gunfighting, in western communities seems to have been
largely confined to itinerant young men caught up in a desperado subculture. By and large,
respectable western men did not engage in dueling or gun fights. By way of contrast, Southern
vigilantism occurred even after formal law enforcement was capable of dealing with illegal activity, and dueling was engaged in by some of the more socially prominent members of white
Southern society. Thus, much of Southern extra-legal violence should be seen as an explicit

rejection of the notion that certain injuries should be handled through legal mechanisms.
For a discussion of extra-legal violence in the nineteenth-century west, see ROGER MCGRATH, GUNFIGHrERs, HIGHWAYMEN AND VIGILANTES (1984).

73. Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 2, at 336-38.
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cure enough to allow their own slaves to possess firearms and hunt on
74
their land.
But it was the attempt of some Southern legislatures to regulate
the behavior of whites, to set limits on the manner in which white
people could carry arms, that brought about controversy and an attempt to develop a jurisprudence that balanced the right to arms with
legislation done in the interest of public safety. Three cases construing legislation of this period bear enduring significance. Two, Aymette
v. State75 and Nunn v. State,76 pioneered analytical constructs that face

even today's state and federal courts. The third, Bliss v. Commonwealth,77 represents the road not taken.

In Bliss, at issue was the construction of the Kentucky constitutional proscription "[tjhat the right of the citizens to bear arms in defence of themselves and the State, shall not be questioned. ' 78 Bliss
had been charged with carrying a sword in a cane, in violation of a
statute forbidding the carrying of concealed weapons. 79 The Kentucky Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutional, although it
left undisturbed the carrying of many sorts of arms under other circumstances. Unconstitutionality did not require "a prohibition
against bearing arms in every possible form . . . [for] whatever re-

strains the full and complete exercise of that right, though not [a complete] destruction of it, is forbidden .... ,,80 The Kentucky Supreme
Court thus viewed the right to bear arms as an absolute, and Bliss
represents the maximum extension of the right, against which less extensive interpretations are measured. 81
74. Id.
75. 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840).
76. 1 Ga. 243 (1846).

77. 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) 90 (1822).
78. Ky. CoNsT. of 1799, art. X, § 23, reprinted in 1 CONsTrruTiONS, supra note 34, at 667.

79. Act of Feb. 3, 1813, ch. LXXXIX, 1813 Ky. Acts 100 (preventing "persons in this Commonwealth from wearing concealed Arms, except in certain cases").
80. Bliss, 12 Ky. (2 Litt.) at 91-92. The court explained its reasoning as to why the right to
bear arms would brook no limitations whatever:
The right existed at the adoption of the constitution; it had then no limits short of the

moral power of the citizens to exercise it, and it in fact consisted in nothing else but in
the liberty of the citizens to bear arms. Diminish that liberty, therefore, and you necessarily restrain the right.

Id. at 92.
81. For example, see Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840):
We are aware that the court of appeals of Kentucky, in the case of Bliss vs. The Commonwealth,. . . has decided that an act of their legislature, similar to the one now under
consideration, is unconstitutional and void. We have great respect for the court by
whom that decision was made, but we cannot concur in their reasoning.
Id. at 160.
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By contrast, inAymette v. State,82 the Tennessee Supreme Court
adopted a more flexible interpretation of the right to arms. Faced
with judging the constitutionality of a statute that prohibited carrying,
among other concealed weapons, Bowie knives, 83 the Aymette court
construed in two respects the Tennessee constitutional provision that
"the free white men of [the] State have a right to keep and to bear
arms for their common defence." 84
The first was the constitutionality of prohibiting the carrying of
concealed weapons. The court held that a prohibition on concealed
weapons was a valid exercise of the legislature's police powers. The
right to bear arms in defense of the state was the right to bear them
openly, for "[t]o bear arms in defence of the State is to employ them
in war . . . [and to do so, such arms] must necessarily be borne

openly. '85 Wearing concealed weapons, the court maintained, was
manifestly different.86 Moreover, the court held:
To hold that the Legislature could pass no law upon this subject by
which to preserve the public peace, and protect our citizens from
the terror which a wanton and unusual exhibition of arms might
produce, or their lives from being endangered by desperadoes with
concealed arms, would be to pervert a great political right to the
worst of purposes, and to make it a social evil of infinitely greater
extent87 to society, than would result from abandoning the right
itself.

The Aymette court also sustained the statute as to the constitutionality of singling out some weapons and not others. 88 Drawing the
distinction between those weapons suited for civilized warfare and
thus protected as "arms" under the state constitution and those which
were not, the court found that the Bowie knife fell in the latter category. 89 It was a distinction that would later be adopted by the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Miller.90
Nunn v. State9 ' involved a similar Georgia statute 92 passed in
1837 restricting the sale and carrying of concealable weapons. Signifi82. 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840).
83. Act of Jan. 27, 1838, ch. 137, § 2, 1837-1838 Tenn. Pub. Acts 200.
84.
85.
86.
87.

TENN. CoNsT. of 1834, art. I, § 26, reprintedin 2 CONsTrrTUIONS, supra note 34, at 1679.
Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 160-61.
Id. at 160.
1& at 159.

88. Id.
89. Id. at 161.

90. 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
91. 1 Ga. 243 (1846).
92. Act of Dec. 25, 1837, §§ 1,4, 1837 Ga. Laws 90 ("An Act to guard and protect the
citizens of this State against the unwarrantable and too prevalent use of deadly weapons").
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cantly, though Georgia's constitution provided for a militia, 93 it failed
entirely to mention a right to arms. Nonetheless, Judge Joseph Henry
Lumpkin, writing for the Georgia Supreme Court, wrote that the
"priviledge of keeping and bearing arms in defence of themselves and
their country" was in effect a fundamental right of the citizens of the
nation, a right created neither by the various state constitutions that
recognized it nor by the Second Amendment of the United States
Constitution. 94 Indeed, though contrary to the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Barron v. Baltimore,95 which held that the Bill of
Rights established rights against the federal government and not the
states, 96 Lumpkin held that the Second Amendment proscribed even
state legislation restricting the open carrying of arms and that such
97
legislation restricting concealed weapons was constitutional.
The evidence from the antebellum era complicates our efforts to
determine the motives of those who passed restrictive firearms legislation later in the century. The antebellum South was a society with a
robust tradition of bearing arms, calling on the citizen to maintain social order and a tolerance for extra-legal violence. Southern constitutional law recognized the importance of the right to bear arms with
perhaps even greater vigor than the nation as a whole. At the same
time even, in the antebellum era, Southern legislators and jurists began to recognize the desirability of placing limits, and given the cultural milieu, we are forced to wonder whether these were more
honored in the breach than by the observance of that right. The
mixed legal and cultural legacy of the antebellum South suggests no
easy answers in determining motive in the decades that would follow.

93. See GA. CONST. of 1789, art. II, § 6, reprintedin I CoNSTTrUrToNs, supra note 34, at 385

(named the governor as the militia's commander-in-chief). The Georgia Constitution of 1777,
promulgated at the start of the Revolutionary War, not only recognized the existence of the
militia, but also mandated that militia units from each county be formed into battalions when
their numbers reach 250 men "liable to bear arms." GA. CoNsr. of 1777, art. XXXV, reprinted
in 1 CoNsTrrunoNs, supra note 34, at 381-82.
94. Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 249-50 (1846).
95. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).

96. Id. at 250-51.
97. Nunn, 1 Ga. at 250.
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POSTBELLUM DEVELOPMENT OF RESTRICTIVE
INTERPRETATIONS

OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS

A. Accommodating Freedom in the Immediate Post-Civil War Era
By the end of the Civil War, the white South knew that slavery
was doomed. President Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation had in
1863 ordered the freedom of all slaves in that part of the Confederacy
not under Union authority.98 But even before Lincoln's proclamation,
even temporary Union ascendancy in a Confederate locale meant de
facto emancipation of slaves. Thus, with the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln made explicit what many had assumed all along, what
the white South saw as a threat, and what black slaves came to count
on: the Civil War was a war to end slavery. 99

It was important to white Southerners, however, to maintain as
much of the status quo as possible. If freedom for the slaves was inevitably to come, in the form of the Thirteenth Amendment as it did or
otherwise, Southern legislatures did their best to assure that such freedom at best would be nominal. With passage of the "Black Codes,"
Southern legislatures tried to guarantee that the freedmen would assume nearly their same positions as slaves.
The Black Codes included laws limiting the rights of blacks: restrictions on the right to testify against whites, 100 the allowance of onerous enforcement of labor contracts, 101 restrictions on the right to
travel, to assemble, and to engage in certain businesses, 1°2 and the
requirement that blacks work for and be responsible to whites. 10 3 Racial restrictions such as these found their way as well into state constitutions passed at the end of the Civil War' 4 and, similar to like
98. Emancipation Proclamation, 12 Stat. 1268 (1863). On September 22, 1862, President
Lincoln signed what became known as the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, 12 Stat.
1267 (1862). In it, President Lincoln declared his intent to free, on January 1, 1863, all slaves
held in that part of the United States still in an active state of rebellion and not controlled by

Union forces. Id.
99. For a recount of the story of a conspiracy to rebel among Mississippi slaves in 1861 after
the start of the Civil War, see WINTHROP JORDAN, TUMULT AND SILENCE AT SECOND CREEK:
AN INQUIRY INTO A CIVIL WAR SLAVE CONSPIRACY (1993).
100. DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION: POLITICAL, MILITARY, SOCIAL, RELI.

1865 TO 1906, at 275, 293 (Walter L. Fleming ed., 1966)
[hereinafter DOCUMENTARY]; see also TEX. CONST. of 1866, art. VIII, § 2, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1798.
101. DOCUMENTARY, supra note 100, at 275.
GIOUS, EDUCATIONAL AND INDUSTRIAL,

102. Id. at 279-80, 283-84.
103. Id. at 280, 282, 287-88, 291.
104. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. of 1866, art. VIII, § 2, reprinted in 2 CONSTrrUTIONS, supra note
34, at 1798.
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statutory law, were intended to achieve the effect of keeping blacks in
their place.
Yet whatever their degree of discomfort with the arming of slaves
or free blacks before emancipation and whatever racist provisions
found their way into legislation or other provisions of constitutional
law after emancipation, manipulation of their constitutions respecting
the right to arms was not a universal device among the Southern
States. Virginia effected no change in that article of its Bill of Rights
recognizing the right to arms. 05 South Carolina broke with the example of previous, its constitutions of 1776, 1778, and 1790, to establish
with the Constitution of 1868 the right to keep and bear arms for the
common defense.' 0 6 Mississippi and North Carolina essentially effected no change in the constitutional right to arms. What had been a
right of "every citizen" to bear arms for self-defense and common defense under the Mississippi constitutions of 1817 and 1832107 became a
right of "all persons" to self-defense in the constitution of 1868.108
North Carolina merely replaced the 1776 constitutional provision
"[t]hat the people have a right to bear arms for the defense of the
State"'1 9 with the language of the Second Amendment. 1 10
Yet concerns about arms in the hands of blacks made their way
into other constitutions promulgated in the years after the Civil War,
when the confederate states were under occupation by union forces.
Racial animus seems to have motivated two distinct patterns of constitutional changes in the right to arms. The first is demonstrated in Arkansas and Florida, where there was initial contraction of the right
and later expansion on a non-racial basis. In 1864 Arkansas continued
105. Compare VA. CONST. of 1870, art. I, § 15, reprintedin 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34,
at 1954 and VA. CONST. of 1864, bill of rights, art. XIII, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 34, at 1937 with VA. BILL OF RIoHrs of 1776, § 13, reprinted in 2 CONSTITrrTiONS, supra
note 34, at 1908, VA. CONST. of 1850, bill of rights, art. XIII, reprinted in 2 CONSTrruTIONS, supra
note 34, at 1920 and VA. CONST. of 1830, art. I, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at
1913.
106. Compare S.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 30, reprintedin 2 CONSTrrUTIONS, supra note 34,
at 1648 with S.C. CONST. of 1776, S.C. CONST. of 1778 and S.C. CONST. of 1790, reprintedin 2
CONSTrrUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1616-36.
107. MIss. CONST. of 1817, art. I, § 23, reprinted in 2 CONSTrTUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1056;
MISS. CONST. of 1832, art. I, § 23, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1068.
108. Miss. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 15, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 1081.
Nor did the state ignore the need for common defense. Article IX provided that able-bodied
males between 18 and 45 be liable to militia duty, as the legislature might provide. 2 CONSTrruTIONS, supra note 34, at 1090-91.
109. N.C. CONST. of 1776, declaration of rights, art. XVII, reprinted in 2 CONSrrunONS,
supra note 34, at 1410.
110. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 24, reprinted in 2 CONsTrrunONS, supra note 34, at 1421.
"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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the restriction of the right to arms to free white men,"' but in 1868
extended the right to the citizens of the state."12 In 1865 Florida eliminated the right to bear arms altogether, 113 but in 1868 returned the
right to bear arms to its constitution, extending the right from one in
favor of the common defense to include the right to self-defense." 4
The second and more prominent pattern of constitutional development respecting the right to arms was an initial expansion of the
right on a non-racial basis, only later to provide for ostensibly nonracial restrictions of the right. Tennessee lies outside but approaches
the pattern, for the state called but one constitutional convention in
the early post-war years. As a result of that convention, the 1870 Constitution expanded the right to arms to all citizens from all free white
men, but at the same time it provided that the legislature would "have
the power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms with a view to
15
prevent crime.""
Other states, however, fit the pattern exactly. Georgia, for example, in 1865 explicitly instituted a constitutional right to arms, 1 6 a
right previously recognized as fundamental in Nunn v. State 1 7 but
which had not been enshrined in the state constitution. The new provision adopted the language of the Second Amendment 1 8 and in effect confirmed the reasoning of Nunn. Yet, in 1868 Georgia provided
as well that the legislature had the authority to "prescribe by law the
manner in which arms may be borne," 11 9 thus rejecting the absolutist
position of Nunn. Texas in 1866 reinstituted the right to bear arms for
self-defense and common defense' 20 and in 1868 added the proviso
that the legislature might regulate the right.' 21 Louisiana in 1864 del11.

ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. II, § 21, reprintedin 1 CONSTrrUTIONS, supra note 34, at 122.
112. ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 5, reprinted in 1 CONSTrrUTIONS, supra note 34, at 135.
113. Compare FLA. CONST. of 1865, art. I, reprinted in 1 CONSTITrTnONS, supra note 34, at
332-34 with Fla. Const. of 1838, art. I, § 21, reprinted in 1 CONsTrTTIONS, supra note 34, at 318.
114. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 22, reprinted in I CONSTITrnONS, supra note 34, at 348.
115. TENN.CONST. of 1870, art. I, § 26, reprintedin 2 CONSTrruTONS, supra note 34, at 1697.
Tennessee's Constitution of 1796 provided a right to bear arms for the common defense to all
"freemen," and the Tennessee Constitution of 1834 to all free white men. TENN.CONST. of 1796,
art. XI, § 26, reprinted in 2 CONsTrTIONS, supra note 34, at 1675; TENN. CONST. of 1834, art. I,
§ 26, reprinted in 2 CONsTrruTIONS, supra note 34, at 1679. Neither of these provisions provided
explicitly for the legislature's regulatory authority.
116. GA. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 4, reprinted in 1 CONsTrrtUnONS, supra note 34, at 402.
117. 1 Ga. 243 (1846).
118. Id.
119. GA. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 14, reprinted in 1 CONSTrrTUONS, supra note 34, at 412.
120. TEx. CONST. of 1866, art. I, § 13, reprintedin 2 CONsTTrutIONS, supra note 34, at 1785.
121. Like its predecessor provisions, Article I, Section 13 of the Texas Constitution of 1868
declared that "[elvery person shall have the right to keep and bear arms, in the lawful defence of
himself or the State," but added the proviso, "under such regulations as the legislature may
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clared that "[a]U able-bodied men shall be armed and disciplined for
its defence,"'1 22 liberalizing the rule of previous constitutions limiting
the duty to be armed to free white men. 123 Yet the Louisiana Constitution of 1868 eliminated the duty of able-bodied males to be armed
and provided instead that the legislature organize the militia of the
state; 124 able men of requisite age would merely be "subject to military duty" at the discretion of the state. 125
The South's history of slavery, its passage of post-war black
codes, and its collective resistance to racial equality render suspicious
these modifications and contractions of the right to arms and indeed,
given the South's history of racially oriented firearms restrictions in
antebellum history, renders these new constitutional provisions especially so. Yet it is not clear that the South's motivation was solely or
even primarily a racial one. As has been suggested in Part I of this
Paper, violence was endemic to Southern society, 126 and lawmakers
may well have had a genuine interest in reducing both the level and
the effect of such violence.
Such an interest is suggested by constitutional provisions aimed at
curtailing dueling, a practice that already was illegal in most states but
nonetheless continued. 127 Anti-dueling provisions appeared even in
constitutions that did not contract the right to arms. In Arkansas, for
example, the 1864 Constitution that continued to limit the right to
bear arms to free white men' 28 also provided that duelists and those
who issued challenges to duel, as well as any who might second or
otherwise aid a duelist, would be denied the rights of voting and of
holding public office. 129 North Carolina, which adopted the language
prescribe." TEx. CoNsT. of 1868, art. I, § 13, reprinted in 2 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at

1802.
122. LA. CONST. of 1864, title IV, art. 67, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at

747.
123. See LA. CONST. of 1812, art. III, § 22, reprintedin CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at
704; LA. CONST. of 1845, title III, art. 60, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 717;
LA. CONST. of 1852, title III, art. 59, reprintedin 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 731.
124. LA. CONST. of 1868, title VIII, art. 144, reprintedin 1 CoNsTrrUrToNs, supra note 34, at
769.

125. Id.
126.
(1979).
127.
128.
129.

See DICKSON D. BRUCE, JR., VIOLENCE AND CULTURE IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH
Id.
ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. II, § 21, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at 122.
ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. VIII, § 12, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at

132; see also ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 22, reprintedin 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 34, at
136 (with identical provisions); ARK. CoNSr. of 1874, art. XIX, § 2, reprinted in 1 CONsTrruTIONS, supra note 34, at 179 (providing merely that a duelist, their second, and any who might
send, accept, or carry a challenge to duel, would be denied the right to hold public office for ten
years).
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of the Second Amendment in its Constitution of 1868,130 simultaneously adopted a provision denying those participating in duels the
131
right to hold public office.
Such provisions were also adopted in Tennessee in 1870132 and
Texas after Reconstruction in 1876133 as part of constitutions that contracted the right to bear arms. 134 Yet dueling was a problem among
whites and not blacks in the South, 135 and any racial animus that
might have existed respecting blacks and the right to bear arms did
not exist with respect to dueling. A commonality between authority
for the legislature to "regulate the wearing of arms with a view to
prevent crime,"' 136 as adopted in constitutions that contracted the right
to bear arms, and disqualification from voting and office holding is the
incentive to eliminate illegal activity. This incentive would be a completely legitimate one for the constitution makers in the postbellum
period.
B.

Constitutional Change and the Right to Arms

If white Southerners after the Civil War desired to maintain, as
closely as possible, their former slaves' legal status, they realized too
that obvious and direct measures to this end would be seen to violate
the Fourteenth Amendment and so be ineffective. The constitutions
adopted by the Southern states after the Fourteenth Amendment
came into effect or in anticipation of its ratification were not explicit
in any discrimination against blacks, and neither were the laws the
Southern states adopted.
Before the Fourteenth Amendment, these states had been free to
enact discriminatory weapons restrictions as an instrument of racial
subjugation. Mississippi in 1865, for example, required blacks not in
military service to obtain a license to carry firearms, ammunition, and
certain other lethal weapons. 137 Louisiana in 1865 prohibited any
130. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 24, reprinted in 2 CONSTrrtuToNs, supra note 34, at 1421.
131. N.C. CONST. of 1868, art. XIV, § 2, reprinted in 2 CONSTrTUTIONS, supra note 34, at
1435. This prohibition attended to any who should "fight a duel, or assist in the same as a
second, or send, accept, or knowingly carry a challenge therefor, or agree to go out of this State
to fight a duel." Id. This provision was reenacted in 1876. N.C. CONST. of 1876, art. XIV, § 2,
reprinted in 2 CoNsu-rrtiONS, supra note 34, at 1451.
132. TENN. CONST. of 1870, art. IX, § 3, reprintedin 2 CoNsTrrr-roNs, supra note 34, at 1706.
133. TEX. CONST. of 1876, art. XVI, § 4, reprinted in 2 CONSTITtrnONs, supra note 34, at
1851.
134. See TENN. CONST. of 1870, art. I, § 26, reprinted in 2 COrUsTnIoNs, supra note 34, at
1697; TEX. CONST. of 1876, art. I, § 23, reprinted in 2 CONsTrrru-ONS, supra note 34, at 1825.
135. See BRUCE, supra note 126.
136. TENN. CONST. of 1870, art. I, § 26, reprinted in 2 CoNsrrurto s, supra note 34, at 1697.
137. DOCUMENTARY, supra note 100, at 289-90.
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black not in military service from carrying any kind of weapon without
the approval of an employer and the local chief of patrol. 138 Alabama
made it entirely unlawful for any black "to own fire-arms, or carry
about his person a pistol or other deadly weapon.' 39 Whites in no
Southern state were restricted in like fashion. Such explicitly racial
restrictions could not survive Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny, however. A new tack was needed if racial discrimination in the control of
arms was to prevail.
Such a tack had been hinted at in Nunn v. State 40 and in Aymette
v. State,' 4 ' cases involving firearms control statutes in the antebellum
era. These cases each involved statutes restricting the carrying of concealed weapons, and each had determined that the right to bear arms
was not absolute. Aymette, construing the right to bear arms for the
common defense of the state, had suggested that the right to bear
arms was only the right to bear them publicly and that the only arms
one had the right to bear were those useful in warfare.' 42 Nunn posited a right to bear arms in favor of both self-defense and the common
defense and agreed that the state might restrict the carrying of concealed weapons as a matter of police power.' 43 Hence, a state might
well restrict all weapons of certain character and might even restrict
all weapons that were concealed.
III.

JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO A CHANGING RIGHT TO ARMS

The response of the Arkansas judiciary to legislative restrictions
on the right to arms serves as a proxy for the response of the judiciary
of the Southern states to such restrictions. An examination of the relevant opinions reveals that the insistence of most of the Southern
states on making explicit the prerogative of the legislature to restrict
the right to bear arms may have been unnecessary. It reveals also that
the analytical construct pioneered in Aymette and Nunn served not
only to legitimate genuine concerns of the legislature respecting
safety, violence, crime, and inappropriate conduct, but also to mask
concerns respecting the carrying of weapons by the state's black
citizens.
138. Id. at 280.
139. See THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES 209 (Alfred Avins ed., 1967).

140.
141.
142.
143.

1 Ga. 243 (1846).
21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840).
See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
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Under a statute passed on February 16, 1875, the Arkansas legislature provided as follows:
That any person who shall wear or carry any pistol of any kind
whatever, or any dirk, butcher or bowie knife, or a sword or a spear
in a cane, brass or metal knucks, or razor, as a weapon, shall be
adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor. .

.

. Provided, that nothing

herein.., shall be so construed as to prohibit any person wearing or
carrying any weapon aforesaid on his own premises, or to prohibit
persons traveling through the country, carrying such weapons while
on a journey with their baggage, or to prohibit ... any person summoned by [an officer of the law] to assist in the execution of any
legal process. 144
That the statute was passed less than a year after the Arkansas Constitution of 1874 was ratified is not material to the legitimacy of the statute, for the Arkansas constitutional provision providing for a right to
bear arms had gone essentially unchanged since its original incarnation in 1836. The original constitution had provided "[t]hat the free
white men of [the] State shall have a right to keep and to bear arms
for their common defence,"'145 as did the Constitution of 1864; 146 the
sole change in this provision effected by the Constitution of 1868, a
change adopted as well by the Constitution of 1874, was that the right
no longer attended to the "free white men" of the state, but instead to
"the citizens.' 47 Thus, the legislature had no more constitutional
power after the 1874 Constitution to restrict the rights of those whose
rights were protected than it did before. 14
When a criminal defendant charged with carrying a pistol or
pocket revolver questioned the constitutionality of the statute in Fife
v. State,' 49 the Arkansas Supreme Court made short work of the arguments that the statute violated the Second Amendment and that it
violated the Arkansas constitutional provision. As to the former argu50
ment, the court implicitly rejected the reasoning of Nunn v. State
and, citing Barron v. Baltimore,'51 declared the statute beyond the
144. Act of Feb. 16, 1875, § 1, 1874 Ark. Acts 155.
145. ARK. CONST. of 1836, art. II, § 21, reprinted in 1 CON sTTUTONS, supra note 34, at 103.
146. ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. II, § 21, reprinted in 1 CONSTTruTIONS, supra note 34, at 122.
147. See ARK. CONST. of 1868, art. I, § 5, reprintedin 1 CONSTiTTIONS, supra note 34, at 135;
ARK. CONST. of 1874, art. II, § 5, reprinted in 1 CONTTrUTIONS, supra note 34, at 155.
148. Indeed, Arkansas' highest court would make this point explicitly in 1882, when it declared that clauses such as those reserving to the legislature the power "to regulate the wearing
of arms, with a view to prevent crime," to be "superabundant," and expressive of nothing more
than "the undefined police powers inherent in all governments." Haile v. State, 38 Ark. 564, 567
(1882) (quoting the Tennessee Bill of Rights).
149. 31 Ark. 455 (1876).
150. 1 Ga. 243 (1846).
151. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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scope of the Second Amendment's protection. 152 As to the suggestion
that the statute violated the state provision, the court cited Aymette v.
State 53 for the proposition that all arms were not protected, but only
those "to be exercised by the people in a body for their common defense."' 154 The only arms protected were those that constituted "ordinary military equipments."'' 5 5 A pistol might be distinguished from
the repeaters used by the army and navy in the Civil War, for such
repeaters had shown themselves in practice to be useful in warfare; a
pistol, declared the court, "was not an arm for war purposes" and thus
156
was susceptible of a ban on carrying in public.
This distinction between ordinary pistols and pistols like those
used in war was crucial in Wilson v. Arkansas, 57 decided in 1878. Wilson argued that his conviction for carrying a pistol in violation of the
1875 statute was void because the trial judge failed to instruct the jury
that "if they believed from the evidence, that the pistol carried by him
was an army size pistol, such as are commonly used in warfare, they
should acquit.' 5 8 The appellate court agreed, declaring that to prohibit "a citizen from wearing or carrying a war arm [in public] ... is an
unwarranted restriction upon his constitutional right to keep and bear
arms.11 59

The court suggested in dicta that there were limits to its statement
of the unreasonable nature of unconcealed carrying restrictions, for
"[n]o doubt in time of peace, persons might be prohibited from wearing war arms to places of public worship, or elections, etc."' 16 On this
point the Arkansas court agreed with the Supreme Court of
Tennessee:
While the private right to keep and use such weapons as we
have indicated as arms, is given as a private right, its exercise is
limited by the duties and proprieties of social life, and such arms are
to be used in the ordinary mode
in which used in the country, and at
6
the usual times and places.' '
The legislature in 1881 finally adopted statutorily the standard
laid down by the courts when it forbade, with exceptions, the wearing
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Fife, 31 Ark. at 458.
21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840).
Fife, 31 Ark. at 458 (quoting Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 158).
ld. at 459 (quoting Aymette, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) at 158).
Id. at 460-61 (quoting Page v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 198, 200 (1871)).
33 Ark. 557 (1878).
Id. at 559.
Id. at 560.
Id.
Andrews v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 165, 181-82 (1871).
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or carrying of "any such pistol as used in the army or navy of the
United States" except uncovered and in the hand. 1 62 In response to
an appeal by a defendant who had been convicted of carrying such a
weapon openly in a holster buckled around his waist, the Arkansas
Supreme Court in an 1882 case, Haile v. State, 63 declared the restriction a reasonable one, within the limits of the Arkansas constitution.
The legislature, the court found, had perceived a danger that armed
citizens had the means to do violence to their fellows upon any offense. The court looked to the reasons that underlay the right to bear
arms to evaluate the legislature's judgment that only military weapons
might be carried and only openly and in the hand.
"The constitutional provision," the court found, "sprung from the
former tyrannical practice, on the part of governments, of disarming
the subjects, so as to render them powerless against oppression...
[and was] not intended to afford citizens the means of prosecuting,
more successfully, their private broils ....
164 Thus, the legislature,
mindful of the perceived danger of increased levels of violence,
reached a constitutionally acceptable balance between achieving the
purposes of the constitutional provision and achieving safety, "by conceding the right to keep such arms, and to bear or use them at will,
upon one's own premises, and restricting the rights to wear them elsewhere in public."' 65
Haile achieved two ends, perhaps both intended by the legislature, both an example for the future, but only one to arguably salutary
effect and the other not. The first end was that Haile had achieved a
clear formula, albeit one presaged by Aymette v. State 66 forty years
earlier, for testing and validating firearms regulation. The restriction
would be judged against the civic end to be accomplished by the constitutional provision, and the restriction would be valid if it did not
deny entirely the right to use a protected weapon, perhaps even all
protected weapons.
162. Act of Apr. 1, 1881, ch. 96, 1881 Ark. Acts 191.
163. 38 Ark. 564 (1882).
164. Id. at 566. In language reminiscent of the contemporary debate about the advisability of
controls on the availability and use of handguns, the court added:
It would be a perversion of [the provision's] object, to make it a protection to the
citizen, in going, with convenience to himself, and after his own fashion, prepared at all
times to inflict death upon his fellow-citizens, upon the occasion of any real or imaginary wrong. The "common defense".., does not require that. The consequent terror
to timid citizens, with the counter violence which would be incited amongst the more
fearless, would be worse than the evil intended to be remedied.

Id.
165. Id.
166. 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 154 (1840).
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The second end carried a pernicious effect. The period of Reconstruction and later Redemption was marked by racial violence in a
way that the period of slavery was not. Violence on the part of the Ku
Klux Klan and other nightriding terrorists were instruments of the oppression of the former slaves and of the maintenance of the Southern
way of life. The right to bear arms had been intended by the champions of the freedmen as a hedge against oppression by their former
masters, and the right had in fact functioned to this end. White
Southerners recognized this, and both the authorities and nightriders
sought to confiscate arms from those blacks who had them and often
to kill or otherwise cow those who would not give them up. The Arkansas legislature had made clear that restrictions on those weapons
that were not useful in war were constitutionally valid. With Haile,
they had combined to render safe the high quality, expensive, military
issue handguns that many former Confederate soldiers still maintained but that were often out of financial reach for cash poor
167
freedmen.

IV. Ti

ENDURING LEGACY?

The model of gun control that emerged from the redeemed South
is a model of distrust for the South's untrustworthy and unredeemed
class, a class deemed both different and inferior, the class of Americans of African descent. There are indications that this model was
followed elsewhere in the nation. These indicationsmay be found in
the treatment of southern and eastern European immigrants to
America in the early twentieth century in the state and city that had
been both a point of entry and the point of settlement for many of
them, New York.
If the white South saw blacks as a threat, the country as a whole
saw southern and eastern Europeans in similar terms. For this reason,
in part, the numbers of such immigrants were subject to significant
limits. 1 68 Beyond this, these immigrants were associated with mental
deficiency, with crime, and most dangerously, with the sort of anarchist inspired crime that was feared in Europe, such as political assas169
sination and politically motivated robberies.
167. See KOPEL, supra note 3, at 336.
168. Immigration Act, ch. 190, § 11, 43 Stat. 153 (1924).
169. KrENN-rr & ANDERSON, supra note 65, at 167.
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In New York, these fears found expression in the passage of the
Sullivan Law in 1911.170 Of statewide dimension, the Sullivan Law
was aimed at New York City, where the large foreign born population
was deemed susceptible to peculiarly susceptible and perhaps inclined
to vice and crime. The statute went beyond the practice of many gun
control statutes by not only prohibiting the carrying of concealed
weapons, but also requiring a permit for ownership or purchase of
weapons.' 71 It is not without significance that the first person convicted under the statute was a member of one of the suspect classes,
172
an Italian immigrant.
If the story of New York's Sullivan Law suggests that a fear of
and a desire to control suspect classes of undesirables bears likeness to
the story of the white South's ventures into gun control in the Reconstruction and post-Reconstruction periods, it is true as well that the
Sullivan Law, like the Southern statutory and constitutional provisions
inaugurated in those periods, spoke to what on its surface was a legitimate societal goal in advancing the cause of public safety. Such goals
would be argued in later years with the passage of the National Firearms Act of 1934173 and in the 1960s and beyond, when concerns with
"Saturday Night Specials"' 74 and with "assault weapons"'"7 would
170. Sullivan Law, ch. 195, 1911 N.Y. Laws 442 (1911) ("amend[ing] the penal law, in relation to the sale and carrying of dangerous weapons").
171. Id. at 443.
172. KENNETT & ANDERSON, supranote 65, at 183. To be fair, not only was the individual in
question a member of a suspect class, but he was also suspect individually. Giuseppe Costabile
was "an Italian mobster of some notoriety ... [and] reputedly a chief of the Black Hand ...
Id. at 184.
173. Act of June 26, 1934, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236. The purpose of the act was to control guns
that gangsters used, but beyond this, to control gangsters. See ROBERT SHERULL, THm SATURDAY NIGirr SPECIAL 57-58 (1973).

174. For example, see this comment by Patrick V. Murphy, then New York City's Police
Commissioner, who in 1971 testified as follows:
What kinds of guns are used by our criminals? ... 24 percent of [illegal weapons
seized by New York City police] were.., of this type....
There is absolutely no legitimate reason to permit the importation, manufacture,
or sale of these weapons, or their parts. They are sought only by people who have illicit
motives, but who may have some difficulty securing a better gun.
SHERiL, supra note 173, at 116 (quoting Gun Control Act to Prohibitthe Sale of SaturdayNight
Special Handguns, 1968: Hearings on S. 2507 Before the Subcomm. on Juvenile Delinquency of
the Senate Comn on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 177 (1986)).
The term "Saturday Night Special" defies a fixed definition, and while most agree that the
Saturday Night Special is objectionable, there are no consistent reasons as to why. American
gun manufacturers label cheap foreign made competition as Saturday Night Specials, and to law
enforcement personnel, often any gun that causes trouble is a Saturday Night Special, especially
if it is cheap, small, and available. Id. at 98-99. Such handguns predate the term Saturday Night
Special. The Derringer and other less notorious pocket pistols, such as the Protector, Little
Joker, Little All Right, Little Giant, Tramps Terror, and Banker's Pal, antedated the term by as
much as a century. Id. at 101. For all its recognizability as a term, the Saturday Night Special is
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take center stage. If safety concerns must be conceded, it should be
recognized as well that local governments have sought to ban firearms
from what is frequently considered one of today's untrustworthy and
176
suspect classes, the urban poor.

The extent of these correspondences is a subject that should engender more research both of historical and legal scholars. The question for such scholars is whether the freedom to pursue individual
rights should ever be regulated in accordance with whether the citizens are deemed worthy of exercising them.

no longer a matter of special police concern. "In the past, we used to face criminals armed with
a cheap Saturday Night Special that could fire off six rounds before loading. Now it is not at all
unusual for a cop to look down the barrel of a TEC-9 with a 32 round clip." H.R. REP. No. 498,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821-22 (quoting Public Safety
and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Ac 1994: Hearings on H.R. 4296 and H.R. 3527
Before the Subcomm. on Crime and CriminalJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of Tony Loizzo, Executive Vice President, National Association of Police Organizations)).
175. Consider, for example, the recent passage of the Violent Crime Control Act. 18 U.S.C.
§ 921 (1994). Part of the Violent Crime Control Act made unlawful the transfer or possession of
certain assault rifles. Id. at § 922. House Report 489, accompanying this part of the bill, quotes
the Committee on the Judiciary, citing the threat posed by "criminals and mentally deranged
people armed with... semi-automatic assault weapons .... " and "[t]he carnage [thus] inflicted
on the American people [by such persons] armed with Rambo-style, semi-automatic assault
weapons has been overwhelming and continuing." H.R. REP. No. 489, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 13
(1994), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821 (quoting HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICLARY, OMNIBUS CRIMF CONTROL Acr, H.R. RF. No. 242, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 203 (1991)).
House Report 489 cites statistics that though "assault weapons make up only about 1 percent of the firearms in circulation.... [T]hey are proportionally more often used in crimes." Id.
(quoting Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, 1994: Hearings on H.R.
4296 & H.R. 3527 Before the Subcomm. on Crime and CriminalJustice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (statement of John Magaw, Director, ATF)). Moreover, the report cites several shootings in which large numbers of innocent people have been
killed or wounded and in which law enforcement officers have been murdered, as having raised
public consciousness about "semi-automatic assault weapon[s]." Id. at 1822. Among these incidents are several prominent shootings that have taken place and have been widely reported in
the recent past. These include the December 1993 Long Island Railroad Commuter train
murders, in which six were killed and nineteen wounded; the February 1993 raid at the compound of the Branch Davidian in Waco, Texas, during which four special agents of the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms were killed and fifteen wounded; the January 1993 killing of two
Central Intelligence Agency employees and the wounding of three others outside the CIA headquarters in McClean, Virginia; and the January 1989 murder of five schoolchildren and the
wounding of twenty-nine others in Stockton, California. Id. at 1823.
176. See Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 2, at 312-13 n.7.

